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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED IN THIS REPLY BRIEF 
POINT I SNOW HAD BOTH ACTUAL AND APPARENT AUTHORITY TO ACT 
FOR AND BIND AMERICAN BY THE REPRESENTATIONS HE MADE AS 
TO THE EFFECT OF THE AGREEMENT MARGETTS SIGNED. 
Standard of Review: Actual or apparent authority of an agent involves 
mixed questions of law and fact which "do not require the deference due to 
findings on questions of pure fact." Margulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 
(Utah 1985). Deference is to be accorded to facts found by the lower court 
from disputed evidence but the legal conclusions resulting from those facts are 
questions of law which are reviewed for correctness. Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 
1089, 1092 (Utah 1991). However, facts determined based on what was 
considered to be reasonable are reviewed for correctness. First Sec. Bank of 
Utah v. Maxwell. 659 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1983). 
POINT II THE CONDOMINIUM PURCHASE AGREEMENT AND THE TWENTY 
PERCENT AGREEMENT MUST BE READ TOGETHER AS ONE 
TRANSACTION AND ANY AMBIGUITY DETERMINED FROM THE TOTAL 
TRANSACTION. 
Standard of Review: Construction of several agreements together as one 
agreement is an issue of law reviewed for correctness. Big Cottonwood Tanner 
Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City. 740 P.2d 1357, 1358 (Utah App. 1987). 
Ambiguity of the agreements is an issue of law reviewed for correctness. 
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). Construction of extrinsic 
evidence to resolve the ambiguity is a matter of fact reviewed under the clearly 
I 
erroneous standard, Craig Food Industries. Inc. v. Weihing. 746 P.2d 279 (Utah 
App. 1987), unless no regard need be given to the demeanor of witnesses and 
those facts were determined based on what was considered to be reasonable. 
Reasonableness is a matter of law reviewed for correctness. First Sec. Bank of 
Utah v. Maxwell 659 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1983). 
POINT III THE CASES RELIED UPON BY NEW WEST IN POINT V.A OF ITS 
BRIEF DO NOT SUPPORT THE AWARD OF RENTAL VALUE. INSTEAD 
THEY SUPPORT MARGETTS' POSITION THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO A 
JUDGMENT BASED ON UNCONSCIONABLE FORFEITURE. 
Standard of Review: Unconscionability is a matter of law reviewable for 
correctness. No findings were made by the lower court on this issue but those 
facts are not in dispute. Therefore, this issue is a matter of law to be reviewed 
for correctness. Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991). 
POINT IV NEW WEST'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE UNLAWFUL 
DETAINER STATUTE HAS BEEN PROPERLY RAISED BELOW AND THE 
JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER MUST BE REVERSED. 
Standard of Review: The facts are not in dispute so whether those facts 
support the claim of unlawful detainer is a question of law to be reviewed for 
correctness. Asav v. Watkins. 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988). 
POINT V THE JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES FINDS NO SUPPORT IN 
THE RECORD AND HAS NO BASIS IN LAW OR FACT. 
Standard of Review: Since there was no evidence introduced on the 
question of attorney's fees, the propriety of the award of attorney's fees is 
entirely a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Commerce Financial 
v. Markwest Corp.. 806 P.2d 200, 202 (Utah App. 1990). 
POINT VT IF THE TRIER OF FACT MUST DETERMINE DAMAGES FROM THE 
OPINION OF EXPERTS, PREJUDGMENT INTEREST MAY NOT BE 
AWARDED. 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Shoreline Development. Inc. v. Utah 
County. 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App. 1992). 
STATUTES TO BE INTERPRETED 
See Addendum to Brief of Appellant for full text of all statutes. 
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IN THE 
COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
NEW WEST FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a 
California corporation, successor-in-
interest to AMERICAN SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a 
California corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
JOHN L. MARGETTS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 930450-CA 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Because of certain new matters, both factual and legal, raised in Appellee's Brief, 
Appellant deems it necessary to respond to and clarify those matters. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant reaffirms the statement of facts in his initial brief and makes the 
following clarifications or corrections to some assertions of fact made by Appellee: 
1. In its Statement of Facts in the first paragraph on page 3 of its brief, New 
West has stated that "American Savings agreed to front the costs of reaching settlements 
with the lienholders". This statement is misleading since "fronting the costs" implies that 
Terrace Falls would reimburse those costs later to American. That was not the intent and 
1 
was not done. American simply paid whatever was negotiated by its agent, Gerald Snow, 
to obtain the releases from lienholders. 
2. In its Statement of Facts in the first paragraph on page 5 of its brief, New 
West asserts that American offered Margetts a credit of $150,000 and "Margetts accepted 
this offer". The fact is that Margetts refused to accept this offer and did not sign the 
agreements until Snow presented the Twenty Percent Agreement and explained to Margetts 
that it would give him what he wanted, that only seven condominiums had to be sold to 
completely pay for his condominium and that American did not have to sign the agreement 
to be bound by it because American would be Terrace Falls Condominiums. (See Statement 
of Facts, 11115-8, Brief of Appellant). 
3. In its Statement of Facts in the second paragraph on page 5 of its brief, New 
West asserts that the "purpose of the Twenty Percent Agreement was to permit Margetts 
to participate in any windfall profits the Project developers might receive after American 
Savings took over the project." Besides the unbelievability of this assertion (see Brief of 
Appellant, pp.29-30), that is not its purpose. That purpose is not stated in the agreement 
nor did Snow state to Margetts that that was its purpose. That was only his explanation of 
it long after the fact when he didn't want to be caught in the cross-fire between Margetts 
and New West. 
4. In its Statement of Facts in the first paragraph on page 7 of its brief, New 
West asserts that Margetts was served with a Notice to Quit by certified mail in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. §§78-36-3 and 6. The evidence only shows that Margetts eventually 
received a copy of the notice but not that it was served by certified mail as required by §78-
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36-6, U.C.A. nor that it complied with §78-36-3, U.C.A. The failure to comply with the 
statute is crucial to New West's attempt to obtain a judgment under the unlawful detainer 
statute. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. MR. SNOW HAD BOTH ACTUAL AND APPARENT AUTHORITY TO ACT 
FOR AND BIND AMERICAN TO THE TOTAL AGREEMENT. 
Snow was authorized by American to act for it in obtaining a release from 
Margetts. Whatever he did and represented in the course of obtaining that release is 
binding on American. If actual authority was not present, the facts show that American 
placed Mr. Snow in a position where all offers and communications came through him and 
Margetts was justified in relying on Snow's actions and representations. American and its 
successor, New West, are bound by the representations Snow made to Margetts as to the 
effect of the agreement he was signing. The suggestions that Snow represented Terrace 
Falls and that American was represented by other attorneys or that Snow didn't intend to 
bind American are all irrelevant when, in fact, Snow carried out American's instructions. 
Margetts reasonably relied upon Snow's explanations of the legal effect of the agreements. 
II. THE SEPARATE AGREEMENTS, BY THEIR OWN TERMS, ARE ONE 
TRANSACTION AND THEY MUST BE CONSTRUED TOGETHER. 
New West's claim that the purchase agreement and the Twenty Percent 
Agreement are each separately unambiguous ignores the fact that the total agreement 
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includes the Twenty Percent Agreement which was the inducement for the signing of the 
purchase agreement. Those agreements include terms each referring to the other. The 
integration clause in the purchase agreement, by its own terms, does not exclude its 
modification by the Twenty Percent Agreement and, in fact, that agreement anticipated 
additional documents. 
III. THE JUDGMENT FOR RENTAL VALUE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY 
OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT NOR HAVE THE ELEMENTS OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
BEEN PROVEN. AMERICAN RECEIVED THE CREDIT AND IT IS 
UNCONSCIONABLE FOR NEW WEST TO RETAIN IT. 
A judgment for rent must be based either on an agreement to pay rent or on 
unjust enrichment. There was no agreement to pay rent and New West did not prove the 
essential elements of unjust enrichment. The cases cited by New West to support an award 
of rental value apply only to offset rental value against the amount to be returned to the 
buyer based on unconscionable forfeiture and therefore support Margetts' position. 
American received substantial value for the credit to Margetts and a nonrefundable credit 
is equivalent to the forfeiture of liquidated damages. 
IV. NEW WEST WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO PROCEED UNDER THE 
UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE AND THE JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL 
DETAINER MUST BE REVERSED. NEW WEST, ITSELF, RAISED THIS ISSUE BELOW 
BUT DID NOT PROVE COMPLIANCE. 
New West attempted to take advantage of the Unlawful Detainer Statute, 
thereby raising that issue itself, but without complying with its strict requirements. Neither 
Margetts nor his wife were served with a notice to quit as required by the statute. 
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Furthermore, his wife was not even joined in this action so any unlawful detainer by 
Margetts caused no loss to New West because she still had the right of possession. At most, 
only nominal damages could be awarded. No provision of the statute applies in this case. 
V. THERE WAS NO CONTRACT, STATUTE OR EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES, THE BURDEN WAS ON NEW WEST TO RAISE 
THIS ISSUE AND PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR IT. 
An award of attorney's fees must be supported by evidence. No evidence was 
submitted to the lower court. There was no statute which authorized attorney's fees and the 
only contract which provided for fees was not in dispute and no judgment was obtained 
under that contract. In fact, New West abandoned its claim under that contract. That 
contract, the Condominium Purchase Agreement, was only in dispute if the court held the 
Twenty Percent Agreement to be a part of that contract, in which event Margetts must 
prevail on the merits and attorney's fees should be awarded to him. 
VI. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST MAY NOT BE AWARDED IF THE TRIER 
OF FACT MUST USE ITS JUDGMENT TO DETERMINE DAMAGES. 
The court was required to use its judgment to determine rental value based on 
the opinion of an expert. That opinion was not a fixed rule or known standard of value 
which could be accepted without the exercise of judgment. The court could have chosen to 
disbelieve either the opinion or the basis for the opinion. Prejudgment interest was 
improperly awarded on both the rental value and the treble damages and attorney's fees 
judgment entered on remand. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SNOW HAD BOTH ACTUAL AND APPARENT AUTHORITY 
TO ACT FOR AND BIND AMERICAN BY THE 
REPRESENTATIONS HE MADE AS TO THE EFFECT OF THE 
AGREEMENT MARGETTS SIGNED. 
In arguing that Mr. Snow had neither actual nor apparent authority to bind 
American to the Twenty Percent Agreement, New West, in Point II of its brief, has asserted 
that Margetts failed to marshall all relevant evidence presented at trial which tends to 
support the findings and to show that these same findings are so lacking in support as to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence. It further claims that, "at most, Margetts can point 
to bits and pieces of evidence . . . that Snow sometimes communicated American Savings' 
positions . . .and that Snow sometimes delivered documents to Margetts which affected 
American Savings' interests." The fact is that these bits and pieces of evidence demonstrate 
that Snow communicated American's position all the time and that Snow delivered all of 
American's documents to Margetts. Snow was the means by which every communication was 
passed between American and Margetts. There was no one else involved. These 
communications were the negotiations between American and Margetts which led to the 
signing of the documents. Every element of the transaction was approved by American and 
communicated to Margetts by Snow. 
In suggesting that Margetts has not marshalled all the evidence in favor of the 
findings, New West has attempted to do so by listing, on pages 11-12 of its brief, the fact 
that Snow represented Terrace Falls, the fact that one letter stated that Kirton & McConkie 
was American's counsel, the fact that Snow did not tell Margetts he was representing 
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American (ignoring the fact that he also did not tell him he was not representing American 
[Tr. I l l ] ) , the unsupported conclusion that American never gave Snow permission to enter 
into agreements on its behalf and did not see the Twenty Percent Agreement in advance, 
and that Snow never ''believed" he was representing American nor "intended" to bind 
American. None of these matters supports the findings of the lower court because they are 
all irrelevant to the question of whether Snow actually did act on behalf of American and 
was its agent. In order to demonstrate this point, let's assume the facts were even worse for 
Margetts' position. Suppose American had told Snow, "You are not our agent and you must 
tell everybody you meet that you are not our agent. But we must have this agreement and 
this release. Go ahead and prepare those for us and we will pay your fees for doing so. 
Yes, you may revise those documents as requested by Margetts. Yes, you can increase our 
offer to Margetts to $50,000 and, yes, you can offer him a $150,000 credit. Remember to 
tell him you are not our agent. But, this has dragged on now for too long. Just get his 
release and get this matter closed." And suppose that Snow followed those instructions. 
What is said by American and Snow and what each of them thinks or intends is irrelevant 
if American gave Snow instructions as to how to deal with Margetts and he carried out those 
instructions. Snow is the agent for American, in fact, no matter what either of them says or 
thinks. 
And it does not matter that Snow also represented Terrace Falls. He obviously 
had more than one client and if there is a conflict, that was his problem-not Margetts'. And 
it does not matter that American may also have been represented by Kirton & McConkie. 
Many clients have multiple attorneys and agents. It is clear in this case that Kirton & 
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McConkie did little or nothing to actually represent American. All communications were 
made through Snow and Snow himself testified that, after the first meeting, "the Kirton & 
McConkie firm was out of the loop'1 and he had no dealings that would indicate to him that 
they were still representing American. [Tr. 100-1]. They played no part in the negotiations. 
Snow did all of that. Snow may not have been acting as American's attorney in the formal 
sense, but he need not be American's attorney in order to be its agent. Agency is not 
limited to the attorney-client relationship. 
All of the evidence that is claimed to support the lower court's finding comes 
within these categories and it is all irrelevant. On the other hand, what American and Snow 
did [see listing on pages 25-6, Brief of Appellant], as opposed to what they thought or said, 
compels a finding of agency. Every communication was made by American through Snow 
and every act of Snow had the authorization and approval of American, with the possible 
exception of the representations made by Snow as to the effect of the Twenty Percent 
Agreement, which were all made incidental to and in furtherance of the objective that Snow 
was authorized to obtain for American and were, therefore, also binding on American. 
Bowen v. Olsen, 576 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1978); Ficke v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 524 P.2d 271 
(Alaska 1974). 
New West asserts that it was Margetts' obligation to ascertain Snow's authority 
despite any representation of Snow. That principle does not apply where the principal, in 
the presence of Margetts, placed the agent in a position to speak for it. By allowing Snow 
to speak for it, American placed Snow in a position of apparent, if not actual, authority to 
bind it. Mr. Lee Stevens, American's representative, appeared with Snow and allowed him 
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to speak for him and to make and increase American's offer. Furthermore, under the 
circumstances present at the final meeting when the documents were signed, this assertion 
is contrary to reason and to the law. It was totally reasonable for Margetts to rely upon the 
representations made by Snow for the reasons set forth on pages 29-30 the Brief of 
Appellant. It is without dispute that Margetts had vehemently refused to sign any agreement 
with American until the Twenty Percent Agreement was presented to him and he was 
assured that American would be bound by it. That agreement was totally valueless if the 
credit to Margetts under that agreement was to come from the insolvent partnership which 
owned the project prior to its conveyance to American and both parties knew that. 
Furthermore, it must be remembered that Snow was an attorney making representations as 
the legal effect of what Margetts was signing and Margetts was there without an attorney. 
Snow spent a couple of hours trying to persuade Margetts to sign the documents, knowing 
that the whole deed-in-lieu transaction which he had negotiated with several others would 
fall apart if Margetts did not sign [T. 140]. And Snow knew that Margetts was leaving town 
the next day and he had to close the transaction that day. [T. 125]. It is reasonable to 
assume that Snow used every argument he could to persuade Margetts to sign-in the face 
of two months of absolute refusal to sign by Margetts. Margetts had no choice but to rely 
on the representations of Snow. The Utah Court of Appeals, in Schuhman v. Green River 
Motel 835 P.2d 992, 996 (Utah 1992) held that such a representation "was the sine gua non 
which dispensed with any further inquiry" and the reliance by the defrauded parties was 
justifiable. That court relied on the Utah Supreme Court's statements in Pace v. Parrish. 
122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273, 276-7: 
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Defendants suggest that the plaintiffs had no right to rely on the 
representations made by defendant, but were bound to make more 
careful and complete inquiry concerning such matters. It is strange 
and inconsistent for defendants to urge the necessity for the plaintiffs 
to cross-examine Mr. Parrish and to doubt and verify his 
representations. 
As to reliance in such situations, see 5 Williston on Contracts, 
Rev. Ed., Sec. 1512. The full measure of the plaintiffs' duty was to 
use reasonable care and observation in connection with these 
representations. Having done so, it does not lie in defendant's 
mouth to say that they were too gullible and shouldn't have believed 
him. 
It was entirely reasonable for Margetts to rely on the statements of Snow, as an attorney, 
as to the legal effect of the documents he was signing. Further inquiry was not only not 
required, it was not available to Margetts at the time. Snow told Margetts the matter must 
be closed that day and Margetts' attorney was not available to him that day. He relied 
totally upon the only attorney who was there to explain the matter to him. 
POINT II 
THE CONDOMINIUM PURCHASE AGREEMENT AND THE 
TWENTY PERCENT AGREEMENT MUST BE READ TOGETHER 
AS ONE TRANSACTION AND ANY AMBIGUITY DETERMINED 
FROM THE TOTAL TRANSACTION. 
New West has argued that the Condominium Purchase Agreement and the 
Twenty Percent Agreement are each clear and unambiguous and that the court should not 
resort to extrinsic evidence to interpret them. This argument misses the whole point that 
these agreements were signed together, at the same time and as a part of the same 
transaction, and must be construed together. That argument also implies the admission, 
made in New West's brief on the prior appeal, that the two agreements when construed 
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together are ambiguous. In fact, while the Purchase Agreement does not refer to the 
Twenty Percent Agreement, since it was prepared earlier, the Twenty Percent Agreement 
recites that it is in "consideration of and as further inducement to . . . the Condominium 
Purchase Agreement, Request for Reconveyance and General Release" and "that except to 
the extent this Agreement may be construed as inconsistent with or as a modification of the 
aforesaid General Release, in which case this Agreement shall prevail." This language 
makes it obvious that they were part of the same transaction and must be construed 
together. 
The presence of an integration clause in the Condominium Purchase Agreement 
does not change this fact since that clause expressly applies only to "prior understandings 
and agreements" and not to any subsequent understandings and agreements. [Ex. 7, H 18]. 
Furthermore, that clause is preceded by another provision by which 
the parties hereby agree to execute and deliver such additional 
documents and to take such further action as may become necessary 
or desirable to fully carry out the provisions and intent of this 
Agreement. 
Subsequent documents were not only anticipated by the Purchase Agreement, but expected 
and perhaps required. 
The agreements, by their own terms, must be read together and any ambiguity 
assessed as to the total agreement and not separately as desired by New West. 
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POINT III 
THE CASES RELIED UPON BY NEW WEST IN POINT V.A 
OF ITS BRIEF DO NOT SUPPORT THE AWARD OF RENTAL 
VALUE. INSTEAD THEY SUPPORT MARGETTS' POSITION 
THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT BASED ON 
UNCONSCIONABLE FORFEITURE. 
New West admits there was no contract to pay rent between Margetts and 
American. Its argument in favor of the award of rental value is now based on cases 
involving the forfeiture of real property sales contracts or unjust enrichment. New West did 
not make any such claims in its pleadings nor at the trial and the lower court did not make 
any findings which would support such claims. New West has cited Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 
1082 (Utah 1983), and Abrams v. Financial Service Co., 13 U.2d 343, 374 P.2d 309 (1962), 
as support for this award. These cases both involve claims, based on unconscionable 
forfeiture, for the return of payments made by defaulting buyers after the termination of 
their contracts, in which rental value is considered as one element of the seller's actual 
damages which may be offset against the amount to be returned to the buyer. Neither case 
involves a claim by the seller for the rental value in a suit to recover the property, as is the 
case here. Those cases have application only where the seller has received more under the 
contract than his actual damages. They, therefore, support the argument made by Margetts 
in Point IV of his Brief of Appellant. 
Marshall v. Bare, 107 Idaho 201, 687 P.2d 591 (1984), also cited by New West, 
involves a home purchase contract which was actually closed and performed. Rental value 
for the use of the home prior to closing was not allowed in that case. The opinion, by way 
of dictum, would have allowed rental value in the case of disaffirmance of the contract by 
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the buyer. That, of course, is not the case here where Margetts was attempting to enforce 
the agreement to obtain the condominium and the question before the court was what 
constituted that agreement. New West's assertion that Margetts "repudiated" the agreement 
and the lower court's conclusion of law using that term are not supported by the facts. Yes, 
Margetts failed to close on the terms demanded by New West but he continued to insist that 
New West close according to his interpretation of the agreement. Once the court adopts 
New West's view of the agreement, that may be a breach on Margetts' part but it is not a 
repudiation. He was, and still is, attempting to enforce the agreement. He has never 
repudiated it. Therefore, any claim for damages based on repudiation does not apply. 
Alternatively, New West attempts to justify the award of rental value on the basis 
of unjust enrichment and cites Knight v. Post 748 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1988), as support for that 
position. In fact, that case held that unjust enrichment did not apply just because a benefit 
was conferred upon a party in the absence of some misleading act by that party. The court, 
at 1099, quoted from Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 
(Utah 1977): 
There must be some misleading act, request for services, or the like, 
to support such an action. Mere failure of performance by one of 
the contracting parties does not give rise to a right of restitution. 
There is no finding in this case of a misleading act, request for services, or the like, on the 
part of Margetts, nor any evidence from which such a finding could be made. Furthermore, 
Marshall v. Bare, supra, at 595, the case which New West claims supports its position, 
expressly held that "recovery for unjust enrichment cannot be awarded where, as here, there 
was an enforceable express contract covering the same subject matter." That has also been 
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the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Karapanos v. Boardwalk Fries, Inc., 837 P.2d 576, 
578 (Utah 1992). The existence of the Condominium Purchase Agreement, which New West 
elected not to enforce, precludes any application of unjust enrichment. 
In Point V.B of its brief, New West concedes the principle of unconscionable 
forfeiture as established in the cases cited in Point IV of the Brief of Appellant. But it 
claims that principle does not apply because the $150,000 credit "did not represent funds 
actually paid to American". New West then claims that the credit "simply represented a 
concession on the purchase price of the unit in consideration of the release of Margetts' 
junior lien" which allowed New West "to avoid the complications of a formal foreclosure". 
This is an admission by New West that the release of Margetts' lien had substantial value 
to American, a value of $150,000! American avoided not only the complications of a formal 
foreclosure, but also the substantial costs of a foreclosure as well as the prospects of a 
lengthy and expensive Chapter 11 bankruptcy and the adverse effect of a foreclosure or 
bankruptcy on the value of the property. [Tr. 41]. That was the same as putting cash into 
American's pocket and American realized that when it agreed to a credit of $150,000. 
Remember that Margetts actually lost over $300,000 when he entered into the purchase 
agreement but American was only willing to credit him with $150,000 of that amount 
because that was what it was worth to American. This consideration to American was no 
different than it would have been if Margetts had actually conveyed another parcel of 
property to American as a down payment on the agreement which both parties agreed had 
a value of $150,000. This agreed value of this other property would represent a "credit" 
against the purchase price in the same sense that the agreed value of the avoidance of the 
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costs and complications of a foreclosure represents a credit. Margetts gave up substantial 
value and American received substantial value. By taking the condominium back, New West 
received this $150,000 in value from Margetts leaving him with nothing. The 
unconscionability of this is present whether that value was in cash or other items of value. 
New West places some emphasis on the wording of the Condominium Purchase 
Agreement that the credit was "nonrefundable". Despite the fact that the Settlement 
Agreement, which was signed at the same time and as a part of the same transaction, does 
not so qualify the credit [See Ex. 6, 11 2], this word does not render this agreement any 
different from the Uniform Real Estate Contracts and other contracts, which were the 
subject of all the cases cited in Point IV of the Brief of Appellant, which provide that "all 
payments which have been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited 
to the Seller as liquidated damages." [II16A, Uniform Real Estate Contract, Addendum; see 
also Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082, 1083 (Utah 1983)]. Forfeiture as liquidated damages and 
nonrefundability are equivalent. 
An unconscionable forfeiture is clearly present in this case and that requires that 
Margetts be given judgment for the $159,234 offset by the rental value of $17,100 resulting 
in a net judgment of $142,134. 
POINT IV 
NEW WEST'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE UNLAWFUL 
DETAINER STATUTE HAS BEEN PROPERLY RAISED BELOW 
AND THE JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER MUST BE 
REVERSED. 
New West has claimed, in Point VI of its brief, that compliance with the 
Unlawful Detainer Statute was not properly raised below. This assertion is surprising in view 
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of the fact that New West specifically sought relief for unlawful detainer in its complaint and 
the allegations of that complaint were denied in Margetts' answer. That placed this issue 
of compliance with the Unlawful Detainer Statute directly before the court and was the basis 
of the New West's entire case, since it abandoned its alternative claim for performance of 
the agreement (R.538, p. 154; R.539, p.334). The lower court could not properly have 
granted a judgment in favor of New West without considering its compliance with the 
Unlawful Detainer Statute under which it sought relief. New West had the burden of 
establishing every element of unlawful detainer. No objections by Margetts were necessary. 
Margetts, both in the lower court and now, of course objects that New West failed to carry 
its burden with respect to those elements. 
The assertion, on page 29 of Appellee's Brief, that Margetts failed to assert that 
a Notice to Quit was improperly served is also not true. Margetts admitted to having 
received a notice to quit but denied all other allegations with respect thereto [Answer, 11 11, 
R. 27-51]. That constitutes a denial rather than an admission that the Notice to Quit was 
properly served as required by the statute. Strict compliance with that statute is the essence 
of an unlawful detainer action and the burden is on New West to prove that it has fully 
complied. That applies to the form of the notice, American Holding Co. v. Hanson, 23 U.2d 
432, 464 P.2d 592 (1970), as well as to the service of the notice, Carstensen v. Hansen, 107 
Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944). New West's admission that it failed to offer any evidence 
on this matter [Brief of Appellee, p.29] deprives it of any right to proceed in unlawful 
detainer. In Carstensen, the mailing of a notice to quit was held to be insufficient because 
it did not comply with the statute. The court stated, at 955: 
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There could be no need to detail certain explicit methods of service 
if any method will do. . . . "Under statutes like this, it is not the fact 
that the party to be notified has actual knowledge of the fact, but it 
is proof that it has been conveyed to him in the prescribed method, 
that gives right of action. . . . The statutory method, once broken 
through, would open wide the gates for vicious precedents, which 
rapidly multiply, and too often, in the end, practically nullify the will 
of the legislature." [quoting Hyde v. Goldsby, 25 Mo. App. 29] 
[Emphasis supplied]. 
Since the decision in that case, the statute has been amended to allow service 
of the notice by registered or certified mail, §78-36-6(2), U.C.A., but not by regular mail. 
New West has not met its burden of proof to show that it is entitled to proceed under the 
Unlawful Detainer Statute. Service by regular mail and actual notice by any method, other 
than those prescribed by the statute, is simply not sufficient to place one in unlawful 
detainer. Other remedies were available to New West to obtain possession of the property 
without the necessity of following the strict requirements of the Unlawful Detainer Statute, 
but if it wants the benefits of the summary procedure, it must follow the steps outlined 
therein. American Holding Co., supra at 593-5 (concurring opinion). 
New West argues that its failure to serve Mrs. Margetts with a notice to quit was 
not raised in Margetts' Answer. This, too, is an essential element of the cause of action 
which New West has the burden to prove. Its failure to do so is fatal to its claim for 
damages for unlawful detainer. It claims that the "unlawful detainer statute does not require 
that all occupants be personally handed a copy of the Notice to Quit." (Brief of Appellee, 
p.29). The statute does, however, require that the notice be served in one of the four ways 
listed in §78-36-6, U.C.A., one of which is handing the notice to the tenant personally. Mrs. 
Margetts was not served with a notice at all, let alone in one of the way prescribed by the 
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statute. The fact that the notice may have included language that it was intended for 
"occupants of the premises" (it was not "addressed" to the occupants, as claimed by New 
West) has no legal effect if the notice is not served on those occupants as required by 
statute. Furthermore, as has already been pointed out, even if Mrs. Margetts had been 
properly served with the notice, she was not joined as a party to the action so any judgment 
could not be effective against her. New West has not suffered any damages as a result of 
Mr. Margetts' occupancy of the property and the judgment for $21,600 for unlawful detainer 
must be reversed. 
In addition to New West's problems with failure to properly serve either Mr. or 
Mrs. Margetts with a notice to quit, it has not shown how it is entitled to proceed under the 
Unlawful Detainer Statute at all. As pointed out in the Brief of Appellant, pp.40-41, New 
West is not entitled to proceed under §78-36-3(l)(b), U.C.A., because there was no lease 
of the property for "an indefinite time with monthly or other periodic rent reserved". New 
West apparently admits that in its brief by making no argument to that effect but now claims 
it complied with subsection (a) or (e). But subsection (a) does not apply because there was 
no contract, express or implied, letting the property to Margetts for a "specified term or 
period". There was neither a "letting" of the property nor a "specified term or period". This 
is the holding of the case relied upon by New West. Marshall v. Bare, supra, at 595, quotes 
from 77 AmJur. VENDOR AND PURCHASER, §324, as follows: 
It is generally held that since the relation of landlord and tenant in 
its proper sense does not exist between a vendee and his vendor 
when the vendee enters under the contract to purchase with the 
permission of the vendor, no promise on the part of the vendee to 
pay for the use and occupation will be implied. 
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Likewise, §78-36-3(l)(e), U.C.A. does not apply. That provision requires the 
service of a notice giving the tenant the alternatives of performing, after default, a condition 
or covenant of the lease under which the property is held or of surrendering the property. 
That provision does not apply in this case since there was no lease or agreement under 
which the property was held and no alternative to perform or surrender was given in the 
notice. That such an alternative must be given as one of the strict requirements of the 
statute was the holding of American Holding Co., supra, at 592, with respect to the similar 
alternative notice required by §78-36-3(l)(c). 
This does not leave New West without a remedy since it always had the non-
summary remedies that existed at common law prior to and after the adoption of the 
Unlawful Detainer Statute. American Holding Co., supra at 593-5 (concurring opinion. 
New West was simply not in a position to sue under the Unlawful Detainer Statute. The 
judgment for unlawful detainer must be reversed. 
POINT V 
THE JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES FINDS NO 
SUPPORT IN THE RECORD AND HAS NO BASIS IN LAW OR 
FACT. 
New West has again argued, on page 29 of its brief, that the issue of attorney's 
fees was not raised in the lower court because, "at trial, Margetts' counsel requested a 
special hearing for the prevailing party to present attorney's fees." How that conclusion 
follows from the stated premise is difficult to understand. Yes, Margetts' counsel did suggest 
that attorney's fees be considered at a separate hearing but no such hearing was held and 
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no evidence as to attorney's fees was ever presented. Since New West was the prevailing 
party, the burden was on it to schedule such a hearing and to present its evidence as to fees. 
There was nothing upon which the court could make a determination as to reasonableness 
of fees. See Commerce Financial v. Markwest Corp., 806 P.2d 200 (Utah App. 1990), in 
which the court stated, at 204: 
. . . a party seeking attorney fees must support its claim in the trial 
court with evidence of their amount and reasonableness. . . . 
. . . . Since C.F. failed completely in its attorney fee proof, we 
conclude that, on the evidence presented, the trial court did not err 
in denying attorney fees to C.F. 
That case further held that if the action involved several claims, some of which were based 
on a contract providing for fees and some of which were not, the failure to apportion the 
fees would alone be sufficient basis for the trial court's denial of attorney's fees. That 
principle is also involved in this case since a portion of New West's claim was based on a 
contract, which it abandoned (see Brief of Appellant p. 45), and a portion was based on an 
allegation of unlawful detainer. The failure to apportion the fees means that there could 
be no determination as to what amount applied to the successful claim. Without that 
determination the judgment cannot stand. 
This suit did not result from Margetts' refusal to perform the Condominium 
Agreement, as claimed by New West. It resulted from New West's refusal to recognize 
Margetts' contention that the Twenty Percent Agreement entitled him to a credit with which 
he could complete his purchase of the condominium. Margetts wanted the condominium. 
He didn't refuse to buy it. The dispute in this matter was entirely over the Twenty Percent 
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Agreement and New West's demand for possession. Neither of those matters entitles New 
West to attorney's fees. 
POINT VI 
IF THE TRIER OF FACT MUST DETERMINE DAMAGES 
FROM THE OPINION OF EXPERTS, PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST MAY NOT BE AWARDED. 
New West misreads the cases when it claims that the fixing of a loss at a 
particular time allows an award of prejudgment interest on that loss. The standard is 
whether the trier of fact must use its best judgment in assessing the damages rather than 
follow fixed rules and known standards of value. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 
414, 422 (Utah 1989). In this case, the opinion of an expert was required to establish rental 
value. The trier of fact could have chosen to disbelieve that expert or to disregard the basis 
for his opinion. That opinion was not, in any sense, a "fixed rule" or a "known standard of 
value". The trier of fact was required to use its best judgment to determine the rental value. 
This Court recently held similarly in Anesthesiologists Assoc, v. St. Benedict's Hospital 852 
P.2d 1030, 1042 (Utah App. 1993), in refusing to award prejudgment interest on lost profits 
based upon the uncontradicted testimony of an expert. The Court stated: 
Despite the fact that Associates' expert used sound mathematical 
methods in arriving at his damages estimate, he did not use the only 
possible method, nor did he measure the damages against a fixed 
standard. The factfinder in this case had to assess expert testimony 
and apply its best judgment to determine a fair amount for lost 
profits. While the expert's estimates were a reliable enough basis for 
awarding damages, the assumptions used to arrive at those estimates 
are by no means the only way to arrive at Associates' damages. 
Prejudgment interest was not justified in this case. New West has not addressed 
Margetts' challenge to the award of prejudgment interest on the entire amount of the new 
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judgment. Like rental value, treble damages for unlawful detainer and attorney's fees are 
not subject to calculation in advance by mathematical certainty and cannot support 
prejudgment interest. That portion of the judgment must also be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
The dispute in this case is over the entire agreement between the parties, which 
includes the Twenty Percent Agreement, which was signed at the same time and as a part 
of the entire transaction and was the inducement for the signing of the other documents. 
The inconsistencies and ambiguities among those documents allow the consideration of 
extrinsic evidence to interpret them and require that the entire agreement be held 
unenforceable and void unless Margetts' view of those documents, as represented to him by 
Mr. Snow, be adopted. That is the only view that makes any sense under the circumstances. 
Mr. Snow was authorized directly by American to negotiate for a release from 
Margetts and, therefore, had actual authority to bind American by his actions and 
representations in obtaining that release. Furthermore, by placing Mr. Snow in a position 
to speak for it and making all communications to Margetts through Mr. Snow, American 
clothed Mr. Snow with apparent authority to act for and bind it and Margetts was justified 
in relying on the statements made by Mr. Snow. 
There was no occupancy agreement upon which the court could base its award 
of rental value and the essential elements of unjust enrichment have not been established. 
In particular, New West has failed to show that it was inequitable for Margetts to retain the 
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benefit of occupancy of the condominium, especially in light of the fact that New West 
retained the condominium that Margetts had paid for and did not receive. 
Instead of pursuing one of the normal remedies available to it to obtain 
possession of the condominium, New West attempted to utilize the summary procedures of 
the Unlawful Detainer Statute but without complying with the strict requirements of that 
statute. The award of damages under that statute was, therefore, improper and must be 
reversed. 
The judgment for attorney's fees must also be reversed because there is no 
statute or contract which authorizes such an award and there was no evidence before the 
court upon which an award of fees could be based. The only possible justification for an 
award of attorney's fees would require the court to hold that the Twenty Percent Agreement, 
the subject of the dispute in this case, was a part of the Condominium Purchase Agreement 
which authorizes an award of fees and, therefore, Margetts' view of the whole agreement 
would be adopted and judgment must be entered in his favor on the merits as well as to 
attorney's fees. 
The entire judgment should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of 
Margetts rescinding the transaction and reinstating his lien, awarding him ownership of the 
condominium, or damages, and his costs and fees. In the alternative, a judgment should be 
awarded to Margetts in the amount of $142,134 for the unconscionable forfeiture. In any 
event, the judgment in favor of New West must be reversed. 
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ADDENDUM 
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UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
'This is a legally binding form, if not understood, seek competent advice." 
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this day of — , A. D., 19 
by and between _ _ — . — — — . 
hereinafter designated as the Seller, and _ _ — — — — — — 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of . 
2.. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in 
the county of , State of Utah, to-wit: 
More particularly described as follows: 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of . 
Dollars ($ 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order .—-—.—— 
strictly within the following times, to-wit: — ($ ) 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $ . shall be paid as follows: 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the day of , 19 . 
4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
principal. Interest shall be charged from on all unpaid portions of the 
purchase price at the rate of per cent ( %) per annum. The Buyer, at his option at anytime, 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made. 
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of 
. with an unpaid balance of 
_, as of 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following , 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed percent 
( Vo) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments; provided that the aggregate monthly installment 
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages. 
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect 
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless 
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer. 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon 
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in ob-
taining said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payments and 
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above. 
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed 
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following: 
The Seller further covenants an 1 agrees that he will not default in the payment of his obligations against said property 
12 The Buyei agiees to p ly the general taxes after 
13 The Buyer further agrees to keep all insuiable build ngs and improvements on said premises insured in a com 
pany acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract or $ 
and to assign said msuiance to the Sellei a hi interests m ly appear an! to delivu the insuiance policy to him 
14 In the event the Buyei snail defiult in tne payment oi any special or genei t taxes assessments oi insurance 
premiums as heiein provided the Se ler may at his option pay said taxes assessments and in urance piemiums or either 
of them and if Sellei elects so to do rl en the Buyei agrees to lepay the Seller upor donnnd all such sums so advanced 
and paid by him, cogethei with lnteies*- thereon iiom date of payment of said sums at the rate ot & of one percent per 
month until paid 
15 Buver agrees that he will not commit oi suffer to be committed any v aste poil or destruction in or upon 
said premises and that he will maintun said prer lses in good condition 
16 In the event of a failure to comply with the terms heieof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make 
any payment or payments when the STTC shall become lue or within days thereafter the 
Seller at his option shall have the (Al wng alternati c remedies 
A Seller shall have the light upon failure of the Buyer to lemedy the default within five days after written notice 
to be iclcat>ed hom all obligations in law and in equity to convey s ud pioperty and all payments which ha\e 
been made theietoioic on this ontract by the Buyer shal be foifeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the non peifjimance of Uic contiaet and the Buver agrees that thr Seller may at his option le enter and take 
posaessioi of s n l piemises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with all impiove 
ments md additions made bv th*. Buyei thereon and the said additions and improvements shall lemain with 
the land and become the property of the Seller the Buver becoming at once a tenant at will of the bellei or 
B The Si.Uei may bung suit and recover judgement for all delinquent installments including costs and attorneys 
fees (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller at his option from resorting 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default) or 
C The Seller shall have the light at his option and upon wntten notice to the Buyer to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable and may elect to treat this contract as a note an I mortage and pass 
title to the Buver subject thereto and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah an I have the propcity sold and the pioceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing 
including costs and attorney s fees and the Seller miv have a judgement for anv deficiency which mav remain 
In the ease of toieclosure the Seller hcicundcr upon the filing of i complaint hall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a icceiver to takr possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents issues and 
profits therefiom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder or hold the same pursuant 
to order of the court and the Sellei upon entry of ju Igment of foreclosure shall be entitled to the possession 
of the said premises dunng the period of redemption 
17 It is agreed that time i» the essence of this agreement 
18 In the event theie are anv 1 ens oi encumbrances against sail premise-, other than those herein provided for or 
referred to oi in the event anv hens oi encumbrances othci than herein provided for shall heieafter accrue against the 
same bv acts or neglect of the Seller then the Buver mav at his option pay and discharge the same and receive credit 
on the amount then remaining due heieunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay 
ments herein provided to be made may at tne option of the B lyei be suspended until such a time as such suspended 
payments shall equal any sums advance i as afoiesaid 
19 The Seller on receiving the pavments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyei oi assigns a goo I and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the 
above described premise** flee and clear of all en« umbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued 
by or through the acts or nejjcct of the Buver and to furnish at his expense a policy of title insurance in the amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller an abstiact brought to late at time of sale or at any time during the 
term of this agreement or at time ot delivery of deed at the opfion of Buyer 
20 It ic hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
in its present condition and that theit >xre no representations covenants or agreements between the parties hereto with 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto 
21 The Buyer and Seller each agiee that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained here 
in, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses including a reasonable attorney s fee which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this agreen cut, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby or in pursuing anv 
remedv provided heicunner or bv the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
or otherwise 
22 It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs executors administrator, sue 
cessors and assigns of the respective parties hereto 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the sa'd parties to this agreement have hereunto signed their names the day and year 
first above written 
Signed in the presence of 
Seller 
Buyer 
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